The Meerkat

MONDAY 6TH APRIL 2008

The Extremist Threat

Mr. Richard Kemp CBE.

Former senior British Military Intelligence officer and now runs a security operation in London; former Commander of British Forces in Afghanistan and a member of COBR, is a former adviser to the Prime Minister, the Government’s Joint Intelligence Committee and the US Government.

EDITORIAL

Jihadi Terrorism 

Dr. Babu Suseelan

Throughout its recorded history, fundamentalist Islam tried to establish an ontological form of Islam through Jihadi terrorism. 

For centuries, Jihadis (religious warriors) have resorted to mass murder, oppression, intimidation, torture, terrorism, assassination and forced religious conversion all in the name of fundamentalist belief system. And so it is today. Only the threat, the methods, and the goals differ. 

Now, Jihadi terrorism is one of the greatest single threats to the existing world order. Modern day jihadi terrorist groups as Hamas, Hizbullah, Lasker-E-Tobia, Al Bader, Taliban, Al Qaeda, Tehreek-E-Jihad, Hizbul Mujahidden virtually ensures that Jihadi terrorism will be with us for many years to come. 

Recent Jihadi terrorist attacks in the U.S, Israel, India, Turkey, Kenya, and Indonesia have proven jihadi's proclivity for terrorist destruction. Jihadi terrorism in Israel and India is unabated and continues to claim thousands of innocent lives each year. All over the world, Jihadi terrorism is a serious threat to peace, security, liberty and democracy. No country in the world is immune from the deleterious effects of this heinous crime. Jihadi ideology in its most extreme form is fraught with dangerous consequences for the entire world. Its committed, hard-core adherents, as distinct from a larger body of the more traditional Muslims are thought to account for some 20 to 25 of the population. Recently, they have acquired an influence, disproportionate to their numbers. It is fundamentalism of a very special ethnocentric and dangerous form, with beliefs and practices that are more extremist. It is the most deadly totalitarian system ever invented. 

Jihadi terrorists are irrational, extreme xenophobic, hostile, and blinded by their dogmatic, fundamentalist faith. The basic premise of Jihadi terrorist is that their violent acts stem from feelings of rage and hatred reinforced by their belief system. Jihadis think and behave differently. They are selfish, impulsive, calculating and act out of their own selfish interest with no regard to the responsible members of society. Whatever their ideology, religious sanction, Jihadis are cunning, intelligent, self-seeking, aware of their criminal acts and incapable of guilt and empathy. Several patterns of thinking drive the Jihadis terrorists, including:
 

  • Rationalization
  • Indifference
  • A sense of entitlement
  • Super optimism
  • Lack of Guilt
  • Shallow emotions
  • Lack of remorse
  • Egocentricity
  • Grandiosity

Ideas expressed in the Koran provide all the justification necessary for Jihadis to carry out deadly terrorist activities. Jihadi terrorists are primarily afraid of freethinking, liberty, pluralism, secularism, and co-existence. They are defensive, capricious, and conditioned by their outdated irrational fanatic religious dogma.  

They reject civil laws; have no fear, anxiety or shame about their dangerous behavior. Commitment to their rigid reductionist paradigm is non-negotiable for the jihadis. Jihadi terrorists espouse many beliefs supporting terrorist activities. For Jihadis, future is the past, and ensuring the brutal past is vital for their existence. Their future and brutal past curve into each other and direct their present anti-social behavior. A spiritual and holistic worldview, systemic thinking, and tolerance are not part of their tradition. Their worldview is myopic and dangerous. 

How do we, then, combat Jihadi fanaticism and terrorism? What efforts should be made to address the root cause of Jihadi terrorism? How do we force Jihadis to freedom and systemic, rational thoughts? How do we address and eliminate predatory offenses by the Jihadi criminals? 

There is, in fact, a great ignorance of or indifference to, this whole subject in democratic societies. This is due at least in part that general reluctance of the mainstream media to subject to Jihadis to a searching scrutiny it deserves. The ignorance or indifference is all the more remiss in that Jihadi terrorism is not, and cannot be, just a regional issue. Jihadis has always had a built-in propensity to gravitate towards its most extreme violent _expression. 

A frequently followed practice by political leaders has been to practice the deceptive art of denial. It is an attempt to avoid direct confrontation with the ideology of Jihadis. Denial is an unrealistic hope that the problems created by the Jihadi terrorists are not serious, and they will go away by appeasement and surrender. Denial is an attempt to cover up their dreadful experience and ease the discomfort by a subtle and ingenious twist of attention. Total denial of the heinous Jihadi terrorism and their irrational thought system, in fact, is symptomatic of inadequate thinking on the part of politicians. The practice of denial increases the risk of greater destruction and death and financial loss. Fanatic Jihadis will not go away by themselves just because we do not want to face their dysfunctional thought system head on. Denial is deadly and can endanger our very survival. 

Prevention efforts are our first line of defense against Jihadi terrorism. Such efforts hold out the promise of terrorism before it starts and sparing death and destruction. Psychological warfare is a valuable tool in combating Jihadi terrorism and its ideology. We need to force these terrorists from their closed, false belief system. We have to help young terrorists construct a New Thought Map: how to change what they think and how they think. Thinking is what direct terrorists to do violent acts. These faulty maps are the pathways to terrorism and criminal acts. Create new thought maps will take effort, but over time it will save the world. We need structured, forceful, directed, comprehensive strategies and actions to force them to rational thinking. 

In the end, there is no single formula to combat fanaticism and terrorism. To eradicate Jihadi terrorism, we need a reformulation or, more ambitiously, a fundamental redefinition of the assumption and practices that guide our policies. The absence of our assertiveness and the inability to confront Jihadis has obscured our efforts and operations against fanatic Jihadis. 

Our combat strategy should focus on the Jihadi organization (i.e., the relationship between Jihadi groups and their external supporters) and their internal structure, goals and values. The act of terrorism should be viewed as a collective criminal act. We, therefore, need to address the psyche and social defects of the jihadi community. We need to force them to freedom, secularism and pluralism. Our assertiveness and confrontation will evoke changes in the direction of our shared norms, values and civilization. 

End of Editorial

Jihadi use of the Internet to Develop Explosive & Demolition Techniques
Understanding how the exploitation of jihadi internet sources can aid the technical intelligence acquisition process

Terrorists and insurgents have increasingly adopted the internet as a cyber sanctuary using both open and closed/secure websites to post propaganda videos and audio dialogues, ‘attack’ videos, explosive recipes, instructional videos and the like. This presentation will detail the scope and scale of this technical intelligence goldmine and demonstrate its relevance to those involved in understanding and infiltrating the jihadist mindset. Explosive recipes, demolition accessories, encyclopedias and exploitation of conventional munitions are covered in detail with their use and preference in geographical theatres identified.

Graham Chambers
Hazard Management Solutions

EDITORIAL

Significant Aviation Terrorist Incidents, 1961-2003:
A Brief Chronology

First U.S. Aircraft Hijacked, May 1, 1961: Puerto Rican born Antuilo Ramierez Ortiz forced at gunpoint
Attack on the Munich Airport, February 10, 1970: Three terrorists attacked El Al passengers in a bus at the Munich Airport with guns and grenades. One passenger was killed and 11 were injured. All three terrorists were captured by airport police.
Attack and Hijacking at the Rome Airport, December 17, 1973: Five terrorists pulled weapons from their luggage in the terminal lounge at the Rome airport, killing two persons. They then attacked a Pan American 707 bound for Beirut and Tehran, destroying it with incendiary grenades and killing 29 persons, including 4 senior Moroccan officials and 14 American employees of ARAMCO. They then herded 5 Italian hostages into a Lufthansa airliner and killed an Italian customs agent as he tried to escape, after which they forced the pilot to fly to Beirut. After Lebanese authorities refused to let the plane land, it landed in Athens, where the terrorists demanded the release of 2 Arab terrorists. In order to make Greek authorities comply with their demands, the terrorists killed a hostage and threw his body onto the tarmac. The plane then flew to Damascus, where it stopped for two hours to obtain fuel and food. It then flew to Kuwait, where the terrorists released their hostages in return for passage to an unknown destination. The Palestine Liberation Organization disavowed the attack, and no group claimed responsibility for it.
Entebbe Hostage Crisis, June 27, 1976: Members of the Baader-Meinhof Group and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) seized an Air France airliner and its 258 passengers. They forced the plane to land in Uganda. On July 3 Israeli commandos successfully rescued the passengers.
TWA Hijacking, June 14, 1985: A Trans-World Airlines flight was hijacked en route to Rome from Athens by two Lebanese Hizballah terrorists and forced to fly to Beirut. The eight crew members and 145 passengers were held for seventeen days, during which one American hostage, a U.S. Navy sailor, was murdered. After being flown twice to Algiers, the aircraft was returned to Beirut after Israel released 435 Lebanese and Palestinian prisoners.
Air India Bombing, June 23, 1985: A bomb destroyed an Air India Boeing 747 over the Atlantic, killing all 329 people aboard. Both Sikh and Kashmiri terrorists were blamed for the attack. Two cargo handlers were killed at Tokyo airport, Japan, when another Sikh bomb exploded in an Air Canada aircraft en route to India.
Egyptian Airliner Hijacking, November 23, 1985: An EgyptAir airplane bound from Athens to Malta and carrying several U.S. citizens was hijacked by the Abu Nidal Group.
Airport Attacks in Rome and Vienna, December 27, 1985: Four gunmen belonging to the Abu Nidal Organization attacked the El Al and Trans World Airlines ticket counters at Rome’s Leonardo da Vinci Airport with grenades and automatic rifles. Thirteen persons were killed and 75 were wounded before Italian police and Israeli security guards killed three of the gunmen and captured the fourth. Three more Abu Nidal gunmen attacked the El Al ticket counter at Vienna’s Schwechat Airport, killing three persons and wounding 30. Austrian police killed one of the gunmen and captured the others.
Aircraft Bombing in Greece, March 30, 1986: A Palestinian splinter group detonated a bomb as TWA Flight 840 approached Athens airport, killing four U.S. citizens.
Kimpo Airport Bombing, September 14, 1986: North Korean agents detonated an explosive device at Seoul’s Kimpo airport, killing 5 persons and injuring 29 others.
Downing of Airliner, November 29, 1987: North Korean agents planted a bomb aboard Korean Air Lines Flight 858, which subsequently crashed into the Indian Ocean.
Pan Am 103 Bombing, December 21, 1988: Pan American Airlines Flight 103 was blown up over Lockerbie, Scotland, by a bomb believed to have been placed on the aircraft by Libyan terrorists in Frankfurt, West Germany. All 259 people on board were killed.
Bombing of UTA Flight 772, September 19, 1989: A bomb explosion destroyed UTA Flight 772 over the Sahara Desert in southern Niger during a flight from Brazzaville to Paris. All 170 persons aboard
Air France Hijacking, December 24, 1994: Members of the Armed Islamic Group seized an Air France Flight to Algeria. The four terrorists were killed during a rescue effort.
Angolan Aircraft Downing, January 2, 1999: A UN plane carrying one U.S. citizen, four Angolans, two Philippine nationals and one Namibian was shot down, according to a UN official. No deaths or injuries were reported. Angolan authorities blamed the attack on National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) rebels. UNITA officials denied shooting down the plane.
Indian Airlines Airbus Hijacking, December 24, 1999: Five militants hijacked a flight bound from Katmandu to New Delhi carrying 189 people. The plane and its passengers were released unharmed on December 31.
Helicopter Hijacking, October 12, 2000: In Sucumbios Province, Ecuador, a group of armed kidnappers led by former members of defunct Colombian terrorist organization the Popular Liberation Army (EPL), took hostage 10 employees of Spanish energy consortium REPSOL. Those kidnapped included five U.S. citizens, one Argentine, one Chilean, one New Zealander, and two French pilots who escaped four days later. On January 30, 2001, the kidnappers murdered American hostage Ronald Sander. The remaining hostages were released on February 23 following the payment of $13 million in ransom by the oil companies.
Srinagar Airport Attack and Assassination Attempt, January 17, 2001: In India, six members of the Lashkar-e-Tayyba militant group were killed when they attempted to seize a local airport. Members of Hizbul Mujaheddin fired two rifle grenades at Farooq Abdullah, Chief Minister for Jammu and Kashmir. Two persons were wounded in the unsuccessful assassination attempt.
Airliner Hijacking in Istanbul, March 15, 2001: Three Chechens hijacked a Russian airliner during a flight from Istanbul to Moscow and forced it to fly to Medina, Saudi Arabia. The plane carried 162 passengers and a crew of 12. After a 22-hour siege during which more than 40 passengers were

The IED Threat to Aviation – A Personal View

Security Planning Specialist

EDITORIAL

BBC News

Sniffer Dogs to detect Tube bombs

Sniffer dogs are being used on trains to detect explosives in nthe wake of the London bombings.

Dozens of dogs are being used on trains, at ticket barrierds and at stations after the blasts of 7th July.
It comes as tube bosses announce that most services will be fully restored within a forth=night (two weeks). Police remain in control\ of Russell Square, scene of the most deadly blast, where the damage was much worse than the other to bombed Tube lines.

Dogs were already being used on the tube in East London to look for drugs and on the Heathrow express to find explosives. Now they are being used across the network, and will continue to be used “indefinitely”, British Transport Police (BTP) said.

The sniffer dogs being used, which tend to be Labradors and spaniels undergo an intensive eoght weeks of training with their dog handler. The handlers watch to see if the dogs freeze or lay down when sniffing , which indicates that something is wrong.

Then spokesman added: “They operate just like dogs who search for drugs except they have been trained to sniff out explosives. The dogs are far more accurate than any machine.”

BTP’s team of 28 dogs are being used on tube stations where most people get on trains or where the network meets mainline rail lines, such as Kings Cross and Victoria. Meanwhile engineers are repairing the damage to at Aldgate, where a bomb on the Circle Line killed eight people. Aldgate tube station could open and a full Metropolitan Line service restored by Monday (July 25th)

The bombed carriage at Edgware Road, on which seven people died, is to be lifted out by crane on Tuesday night, weather permitting, and London Underground expects police to hand the site back to them soon.

Fifty six people died in the blasts in Tavistock Square, Edgware Road Station, Liverpool Street Station and Kings Cross Station. More than 700 other people were injured in the explosions.

Countering Transport Terrorism - Effective Canine Use

Trains, Boats, Planes and Road Transport by the effective deployment of explosive search dog teams. ‘The Low Tech Solution’ Protecting life and property within the national and international transport infrastructure.

John Franklin-Webb

The Value of Detection and Deterrents

Since the 11th September 2001, vast sums of money have been spent developing new strategies for detection and deterrents. This presentation seeks to explore the terrorist methodology and challenges the effectiveness of this strategy.

Explaining the sometimes complex arguments and positions that have emerged during the course of discussions on the "Oslo Process", which aims to ban cluster munitions which cause "unacceptable harm" to civilians.
 
Steve Swain

Steve Swain joined Control Risks in September 2006 after retiring as a Chief Superintendent from the MPS, where he was responsible for designing counter terrorist policing options for the UK.

UXO Clearance in the Czech Republic

The lecture describes legal formalities for UXO clearance in Czech Republic and dividing competences and responsibilities among The Police, Army and private sector. 

Discussed are also detectors and detection technologies using in the Czech Republic as well as some interesting findings.

Additionally are presented also other activities company Borgata Ltd. tight connected with UXO clearance

Ass. Prof. Dr. M.Sc.  Jiri CHLADEK,  Borgata Ltd. Prague, Czech Republic

Jiri Chladek is graduated on University of Pardubice, Dept. of Explosives M.Sc. (82) and Dr. (89) and later was established by Ass. Prof. in a field of knowledge “Weapons & Ammunition” on University of Defence.  By Ministry of Justice was certified like a expert in a field of Explosives and EOD, he is part time university teacher and instructor in EOD courses. Now is working like Head of UXO clearance operation in family owned company Borgata Ltd.

EDITORIAL

South Lebanon Slowly Starts to Lose It’s Mines but Too late for Some.

Independent
December 2000

Robert Fisk

Mohamed Sowaid is nine and has multiple shrapnel wounds. His brother Ali – equally mutilated – is only five. Issam Missilmani is a 33 year old fisherman who had his right and left hand blown off.
Alaa Hussein is 17 and Mohamed Hijazi is 22; both were blown up, Mohamed losing his left foot. They are just the mine casualties of Southern Lebanon I one day this month (December 2000)

In all, 11 civilians have been killed and at least 56 seriously wounded in the fields around their homes since then Israeli Army moved out of Lebanon in May, leaving behind 70,000 mines. Then figure isn’t official. The four volumes of documents and mine field maps, which the Israeli Army handed to the United Nations after they ended their 22 year occupation of 10% of Lebanon seven months ago (May 2000) are a history of warfare, of #4 Israeli anti personnel mines, #10 plastic mines of booby traps and minefield upon minefieldIn all, the UN believes there are 130,000 mines and booby traps and unexploded bombs scattered across the harsh, brown hills of Southern Lebanon, some of them dating back to the French mandate and the Vichy French-Allied battles of WWII.

Fresh from 10 months in Kosovo, Don Macdonald from Forres, Grampian – after 22 years as an RAF bomb disposal officer – sits in his office at Naqqoura on the Lebanese – Israeli border with computer banks that show him the location of the tiniest Bits of ordnance in the wadis and tickets of this dangerous countryside. The Israelis handed over a list of 288 booby traps. At Kfar Roumane was “a booby trapped vest (flak jacket) and side charg”e. Near Yohmor was “ a trapped Light Antiarmour Weapon”. Both were left during the occupation for Hizbollah guerrillas to pick up.

*****

Mines and Booby Trap Clearance in Southern Lebanon

Guy Lucas MBE

Former British Army Officer (combat engineer, specialist diver, EOD officer). MD/owner of BACTEC International Limited/Head of group of companies providing specialist EOD and mine action/clearance expertise worldwide.

The Practical Application of AEP55 to Vehicle Landmine Testing

AEP55 is a NATO document designed to standardise the test procedure for assessing the protection offered by Logistics and Light Armoured Vehicles. This paper will discuss how practical it is to apply to live range tests and where it could be improved.

Steve Holland

Steve Holland MIExpE is a specialist in blast mitigation. He has designed and tested a wide range of products for commercial and military purposes.

TUESDAY 8TH APRIL 2008

Life after EOD

The paper aims to offer advice on the challenges facing EOD operators seeking to utilise their skills and experience in the wider security market and corporate security in general

The presenter spent 29 years in the British Army with the Royal Engineers. A significant part of this time was spent employed in Explosive Ordnance Disposal, Counter Terrorism, and Security and Intelligence fields, including back to back tours as an EOD Squadron Commander and Commanding Officer of the UK Defence EOD School (DEODS) . He has a Master’s degree in Corporate Security Management, funded full-time by the MOD in lieu of reading for an in-service MBA. Since leaving the military he has worked for the UK Government as a protective security adviser to industry, dealing predominantly with Critical National Infrastructure and more recently as an independent consultant.
The talk aims to explore the challenges faced by EOD personnel seeking civilian employment, how their skills and experience may be attractive to the commercial sector, whether in general or as a specialist capability. It will offer an opinion on where these skills and qualities fit within the range of commercial/ industry management skills, the risk management spectrum and commercial imperatives. It will also offer some pointers  on the strengths and limitations of EOD experience and skills set against the expectations of employers and prospective clients.

Jim Castle MBE MSc FSyI

Jim is a former CO of the UK Defence EOD School and Government Protective Security Advisor. He is now involved in Corporate Security consultancy
 
 
EDITORIAL
 

The Oslo process: ending cluster-bombs
 
Steve Goose is director of the arms division at Human Rights Watch and co-chair of the Cluster Munitions Coalition
 
 
 
The global campaign for a ban on cluster-munitions is gathering momentum, says Steve Goose of Human Rights Watch.
 
19 - 11 - 2007
 

The "convention on certain conventional weapons" (CCW) ended its annual meeting in Geneva on 7-13 November 2007 without achieving much. Perhaps that is not surprising. It is a consensus-driven forum dominated by the United States, Russia and China that likes to "go slow and aim low" when asked to take on weapons systems.

But the convention's sloth is no laughing matter for the 255 people killed or injured in Lebanon since August 2006 by cluster bomblets dropped by Israel in its war with Hizbollah; or the dozens who die or lose a limb in southeast Asia each year from clusters fired by United States forces as long ago as the 1960s and 1970s; or the tens of thousands of cluster-munition victims in wars in Iraq, Afghanistan, Kosovo, Chechnya, and some twenty other countries.

Cluster-munitions leave a deadly legacy for years because once dropped, they scatter hundreds of unguided bomblets randomly over a wide area - and then many fail to explode. In effect, they turn into landmines. And just as campaigners spurred a global ban on anti-personnel landmines in the wake of the CCW's inability to do so, the aim today is to ban cluster-bombs that kill civilians around the world every week of every year.
The effort is gathering momentum. In 2007, Norway launched an initiative to negotiate a ban on clusters outside of the weapons convention. The confident aim among campaigners is that this project - known as the Oslo process - will bear fruit in 2008 with a new treaty that prohibits the use, production, stockpiling, and trade of cluster-munitions that cause unacceptable harm to civilians.

The next stage in the Oslo process is a meeting in Vienna (5-7 December 2007) to engage in detailed consideration of a treaty text; further meetings are planned in Wellington (18-22 February 2008) and Dublin (19-30 May 2008). So far, more than eighty countries have signed on to the process. The failure of the CCW to advance towards a new clusters treaty is a strong signal to the rest that it's time to support Oslo.

The nature of the Geneva discussions illustrates why the Oslo process is the more likely route to progress in achieving an international cluster-munitions ban. Several states - among them Brazil, India, Pakistan, South Korea and the United States - were apparently shocked by the prospect of movement elsewhere into an attempt to revive talks within the CCW. But all the meeting could produce was a weak agreement to "negotiate a proposal" on cluster munitions in 2008. This is characteristic: the convention has a penchant for unending, unproductive talks and its consensus rules ensure the weakest position is accepted.

Moreover, representatives of the main backers of the CCW process (including China, Israel, and Russia as well as South Korea and the US) have revealed both in private conversations and public statements a remarkable uniformity about how they envisaged the outcome of negotiations: no prohibitions and no real restrictions on use. In short, it's very unlikely that any CCW agreement would alleviate the humanitarian harm caused by cluster munitions.
The Oslo process, by contrast, has the energy required to address the carnage caused by cluster-munitions effectively and rapidly. The countries committed to progress on the issue would best contribute by joining the Vienna and Wellington meetings to further develop a treaty-ban text. They should commit to conclude formal negotiations in the Dublin meeting on a treaty forbidding the use, production, transfer and stockpiling of cluster munitions that cause unacceptable harm to civilians by the end of 2008.

Some states - France, Germany, Switzerland, and Britain included - have up to now tried to have it both ways by signalling support for the Oslo process while continuing to talk about the CCW as the "most appropriate forum" for addressing cluster munitions. They have a real opportunity to become leaders in the Oslo process by abandoning an approach that is becoming increasingly untenable.

By contrast, other countries (such as China, Russia, and the United States) which maintain big stockpiles of clusters are likely to stay outside the Oslo process for the time being, and maintain with a straight face that they are dealing with the issue effectively in the CCW. But once a ban is negotiated most states will not be willing to pay the political price of flouting it: as with the mine-ban treaty (or "Ottawa convention") 0f 1997, they will act in accordance with the new standard of behaviour being established globally.

Every day of delay adds to the grim toll. On 5 November 2007 - designated as the first global day of action against cluster munitions - the Daily Star (Beirut) reported that Abbas Khalil, Mohammad Khalil and Hafez Milhim were wounded by cluster-bombs while working in an agricultural field in southern Lebanon. The world can't wait any longer. The countdown to a clusters treaty has begun.

The Cluster Munition Ban: The Key Issues

Explaining the sometimes complex arguments and positions that have emerged during the course of discussions on the "Oslo Process", which aims to ban cluster munitions which cause "unacceptable harm" to civilians.

Colin King

Colin King is a former army EOD officer and intelligence analyst, with operational experience in many regions. He runs an EOD company and writes the Jane's mines and EOD reference books.

UN-EXPLODED CLUSTER BOMBS AND SUB-MUNITIONS IN SOUTH LEBANON: REALITY FROM A FIELD PERSPECTIVE 

The severe contamination of un-exploded sub-munitions in South Lebanon served as a catalyst for the ‘Oslo Process”. The Presentation will look at the types/quantities of sub-munitions, their reason for failure, civilian and de-mining personnel casualties and progress on clearance.

Chris Clark MBE MC

Chris Clark, currently UN Programme Manager for the Mine Action Programme in South Lebanon, is a Senior Technical Advisor and Mine Action Programme Manager for United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) with extensive knowledge and experience of Mine Action Programmes worldwide. Previously, UN Programme Manager for Sudan and UN Chief of Operations in Kosovo.

Has been in South Lebanon for five years now, remained in place during the recent war and thus has detailed and personnel knowledge of the cluster munition situation there.

Extract:

Following the 34 day conflict between Israel and Hezbollah in the summer of 2006, South Lebanon remains littered with a huge and herewith to unprecedented number of un-exploded sub-munitions. In the absence of any direct and usable information from the Israelis estimates, garnered from Israeli media reports, place the amount fired into South Lebanon at some four million, which even with a conservative estimate of the average failure rate puts close to one million un-exploded individual sub-munitions on the ground.

In South Lebanon all three means of delivery have been used (Air dropped, artillery fired, rocket delivered). Whereas, a 1% failure rate may often be achieved in controlled tests, the exigencies of combat operations, vagrancies of storage and transportation on the battle field all combine to make the actual failure rate different, and most certainly higher. Consistent refusal to recognize and accept that un-exploded sub-munitions are always (Kuwait/Iraq 1991, Kosovo/Serbia 1999, Afghanistan 1999/2000 and Iraq 2003) found in significantly higher quantities on the ground, after combat usage, than that theoretically indicated by routine service testing precludes any balanced discussion on the military utility of these weapons versus post-conflict humanitarian impact due to high and arguably un-acceptable actual failure rates.

During the actual conflict in Lebanon approximately 1000 - 1200 Lebanese civilians were injured/killed as direct result of the intensive bombing…since the “Peace” has come over 200 civilians have been injured/killed by un-exploded sub-munitions….plus 1000’s more denied access to their lands and the ability to return to normalcy….this is the real measurement of the post-conflict impact of the use of cluster munitions. Additionally, the international community is currently paying approximately US$95 million to fund the post-conflict clearance of un-exploded sub-munitions in South Lebanon ($75m 2006/2007 and $20m 2008). Since the ceasefire (14 August 2006) 47 specialist clearance personnel have been injured whilst locating and clearing these weapons, of which 13 subsequently died of their injuries.

The M42/46, M77 and M85 are all characterized by being mechanically armed, impact detonated and incorporating a stab or friction sensitive detonator. The use of M42/46 and M77 types have routinely created an extensive and complicated post conflict ERW problem and its use in South Lebanon in 2006 and resulting high un-exploded numbers on the ground are another clear example of this.

EDITORIAL

Significant Building Terrorist Incidents, 1961-2003:

Bombing of U.S. Embassy in Beirut, April 18, 1983: Sixty-three people, including the CIA’s Middle East director, were killed and 120 were injured in a 400-pound suicide truck-bomb attack on the U.S. Embassy in Beirut, Lebanon. The Islamic Jihad claimed responsibility.
Bombing of Marine Barracks, Beirut, October 23, 1983: Simultaneous suicide truck-bomb attacks were made on American and French compounds in Beirut, Lebanon. A 12,000-pound bomb destroyed the U.S. compound, killing 242 Americans, while 58 French troops were killed when a 400-pound device
Restaurant Bombing in Spain, April 12, 1984: Eighteen U.S. servicemen were killed and 83 people were injured in a bomb attack on a restaurant near a U.S. Air Force Base in Torrejon, Spain.
Attack on a Restaurant in El Salvador, June 19, 1985: Members of the FMLN (Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front) fired on a restaurant in the Zona Rosa district of San Salvador, killing four Marine Security Guards assigned to the U.S. Embassy and nine Salvadorean civilians.
Berlin Discothèque Bombing, April 5, 1986: Two U.S. soldiers were killed and 79 American servicemen were injured in a Libyan bomb attack on a nightclub in West Berlin, West Germany. In retaliation U.S. military jets bombed targets in and around Tripoli and Benghazi.
Servicemen’s Bar Attack, December 26, 1987: Catalan separatists bombed a Barcelona bar frequented by U.S. servicemen, resulting in the death of one U.S. citizen.
U.S. Embassy Bombed in Peru, January 15, 1990: The Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement bombed the U.S. Embassy in Lima, Peru.
Bombing of the Israeli Embassy in Argentina, March 17, 1992: Hizballah claimed responsibility for a blast that leveled the Israeli Embassy in Buenos Aires, Argentina, causing the deaths of 29 and wounding 242.
World Trade Center Bombing, February 26, 1993: The World Trade Center in New York City was badly damaged when a car bomb planted by Islamic terrorists exploded in an underground garage. The bomb left 6 people dead and 1,000 injured. The men carrying out the attack were followers of Umar Abd al-Rahman, an Egyptian cleric.
Bombing of the Federal Building in Oklahoma City, April 19, 1995: Right-wing extremists Timothy McVeigh and Terry Nichols destroyed the Federal Building in Oklahoma City with a massive truck bomb that killed 166 and injured hundreds more in what was up to then the largest terrorist attack on American soil.
Attack on U.S. Embassy in Moscow, September 13, 1995: A rocket-propelled grenade was fired through the window of the U.S. Embassy in Moscow, ostensibly in retaliation for U.S. strikes on Serb positions in Bosnia.
Saudi Military Installation Attack, November 13, 1995: The Islamic Movement of Change planted a bomb in a Riyadh military compound that killed one U.S. citizen, several foreign national employees of the U.S. government, and over 40 others.
Egyptian Embassy Attack, November 19, 1995: A suicide bomber drove a vehicle into the Egyptian Embassy compound in Islamabad, Pakistan, killing at least 16 and injuring 60 persons. Three militant Islamic groups claimed responsibility.
Athens Embassy Attack, February 15, 1996: Unidentified assailants fired a rocket at the U.S. Embassy compound in Athens, causing minor damage to three diplomatic vehicles and some surrounding buildings. Circumstances of the attack suggested it was an operation carried out by the 17 November group.
Khobar Towers Bombing, June 25, 1996: A fuel truck carrying a bomb exploded outside the US military's Khobar Towers housing facility in Dhahran, killing 19 U.S. military personnel and wounding 515 persons, including 240 U.S. personnel. Several groups claimed responsibility for the attack.
Paris Subway Explosion, December 3, 1996: A bomb exploded aboard a Paris subway train as it arrived at the Port Royal station, killing two French nationals, a Moroccan, and a Canadian, and injuring 86 persons. Among those injured were one U.S. citizen and a Canadian. No one claimed responsibility for the attack, but Algerian extremists are suspected.
Hotel Nacional Bombing, July 12, 1997: A bomb exploded at the Hotel Nacional in Havana, injuring three persons and causing minor damage. A previously unknown group calling itself the Military Liberation Union claimed responsibility.
Israeli Shopping Mall Bombing, September 4, 1997: Three suicide bombers of HAMAS detonated bombs in the Ben Yehuda shopping mall in Jerusalem, killing eight persons, including the bombers, and wounding nearly 200 others.
U.S. Embassy Bombings in East Africa, August 7, 1998: A bomb exploded at the rear entrance of the U.S. Embassy in Nairobi, Kenya, killing 12 U.S. citizens, 32 Foreign Service Nationals (FSNs), and 247 Kenyan citizens. Approximately 5,000 Kenyans, 6 U.S. citizens, and 13 FSNs were injured. The U.S. Embassy building sustained extensive structural damage. Almost simultaneously, a bomb detonated outside the U.S. Embassy in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, killing 7 FSNs and 3 Tanzanian citizens, and injuring 1 U.S. citizen and 76 Tanzanians. The explosion caused major structural damage to the U.S. Embassy facility. The U.S. Government held Usama Bin Laden responsible.
Church Bombing in Tajikistan, October 1, 2000: Unidentified militants detonated two bombs in a Christian church in Dushanbe, killing seven persons and injuring 70 others. The church was founded by a Korean-born U.S. citizen, and most of those killed and wounded were Korean. No one claimed responsibility.
Manila Bombing, December 30, 2000: A bomb exploded in a plaza across the street from the U.S. Embassy in Manila, injuring nine persons. The Moro Islamic Liberation Front was likely responsible.
BBC Studios Bombing, March 4, 2001: A car bomb exploded at midnight outside of the British Broadcasting Corporation’s main production studios in London. One person was injured. British authorities suspected the Real IRA had planted the bomb.
HAMAS Restaurant Bombing, August 9, 2001: A HAMAS-planted bomb detonated in a Jerusalem pizza restaurant, killing 15 people and wounding more than 90. The Israeli response included occupation of Orient House, the Palestine Liberation Organization’s political headquarters in East Jerusalem.
Suicide Bombing in Israel, March 27, 2002: A suicide bombing in a noted restaurant in Netanya, Israel, killed 22 persons and wounded 140. One of the dead was a U.S. citizen. The Islamic Resistance Movement (HAMAS) claimed responsibility.
Temple Bombing in Kashmir, March 30, 2002: A bomb explosion at a Hindu temple in Jammu, Kashmir, killed 10 persons. The Islamic Front claimed responsibility.
Synagogue Bombing in Tunisia, April 11, 2002: A suicide bomber detonated a truck loaded with propane gas outside a historic synagogue in Djerba, Tunisia. The 16 dead included 11 Germans, one French citizen, and three Tunisians. Twenty-six German tourists were injured. The Islamic Army for the Liberation of the Holy Sites claimed responsibility.
Bombing at the Hebrew University, July 31, 2002: A bomb hidden in a bag in the Frank Sinatra International Student Center of Jerusalem’s Hebrew University killed 9 persons and wounded 87. The dead included 5 U.S. citizens and 4 Israelis. The wounded included 4 U.S. citizens, 2 Japanese, and 3 South Koreans. The Islamic Resistance Movement (HAMAS) claimed responsibility.
Car Bomb Explosion in Bali, October 12, 2002: A car bomb exploded outside the Sari Club Discotheque in Denpasar, Bali, Indonesia, killing 202 persons and wounding 300 more. Most of the casualties, including 88 of the dead, were Australian tourists. Seven Americans were among the dead. Al-Qaida claimed responsibility. Two suspects were later arrested and convicted. Iman Samudra, who had trained in Afghanistan with al-Qaeda and was suspected of belonging to Jemaah Islamiya, was sentenced to death on September 10, 2003.
Bombing of a Government Building in Chechnya, December 27, 2002: A suicide bomb attack involving two explosives-laden trucks destroyed the offices of the pro-Russian Chechen government in Grozny. The attack killed over 80 people and wounded 210. According to a Chechen website run by the Kavkaz Center, Chechen warlord Shamil Basayev claimed responsibility.
Night Club Bombing in Colombia, February 7, 2003: A car bomb exploded outside a night club in Bogota, Colombia, killing 32 persons and wounding 160. No group claimed responsibility, but Colombian officials suspected the Colombian Revolutionary Armed Forces (FARC).
Truck Bomb Attacks in Saudi Arabia, May 12, 2003: Suicide bombers attacked three residential compounds for foreign workers in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. The 34 dead included 9 attackers, 7 other Saudis, 9 U.S. citizens, and one citizen each from the United Kingdom, Ireland, and the Philippines. Another American died on June 1. It was the first major attack on U.S. targets in Saudi Arabia since the end of the war in Iraq. Saudi authorities arrested 11 al-Qaida suspects on May 28.
Truck Bombing in Chechnya, May 12, 2003: A truck bomb explosion demolished a government compound in Znamenskoye, Chechnya, killing 54 persons. Russian authorities blamed followers of a Saudi-born Islamist named Abu Walid. President Vladimir Putin said that he suspected that there was an al-Qaida connection.
Truck Bombing in Northern Ossetia, August 1, 2003: A suicide truck bomb attack destroyed a Russian military hospital in Mozdok, North Ossetia and killed 50 persons. Russian authorities attributed the attack to followers of Chechen rebel leader Shamil Basayev.
Hotel Bombing in Indonesia, August 5, 2003: A car bomb exploded outside the Marriott Hotel in Jakarta, Indonesia, killing 10 persons and wounding 150. One of the dead was a Dutch citizen. The wounded included an American, a Canadian, an Australian, and two Chinese. Indonesian authorities suspected the Jemaah Islamiah, which had carried out the October 12, 2002 bombing in Bali.
Bombing of the Jordanian Embassy in Baghdad, August 7, 2003: A car bomb exploded outside the Jordanian Embassy in Baghdad, Iraq, killing 19 persons and wounding 65. Most of the victims were apparently Iraqis, including 5 police officers. No group claimed responsibility.
Bombing of the UN Headquarters in Baghdad, August 19, 2003: A truck loaded with surplus Iraqi ordnance exploded outside the United Nations Headquarters in Baghdad’s Canal Hotel. A hospital across the street was also heavily damaged. The 23 dead included UN Special Representative Sergio Viera de Mello. More than 100 persons were wounded. It was not clear whether the bomber was a Baath Party loyalist or a foreign Islamic militant. An al-Qaeda branch called the Brigades of the Martyr Abu Hafz al-Masri later claimed responsibility.
A Second Attack on the UN Headquarters in Baghdad, September 22, 2003: A suicide car bomb attack on the UN Headquarters in Baghdad killed a security guard and wounded 19 other persons.
Rocket Attack on the al-Rashid Hotel in Baghdad, October 26, 2003: Iraqis using an improvised rocket launcher bombarded the al-Rashid Hotel in Baghdad, killing one U.S. Army officer and wounding 17 persons. The wounded included 4 U.S. military personnel and seven American civilians. Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul D. Wolfowitz, who was staying at the hotel, was not injured. After visiting the wounded, he said, "They’re not going to scare us away; we’re not giving up on this job."
Synagogue Bombings in Istanbul, November 15, 2003: Two suicide truck bombs exploded outside the Neve Shalom and Beth Israel synagogues in Istanbul, killing 25 persons and wounding at least 300 more. The initial claim of responsibility came from a Turkish militant group, the Great Eastern Islamic Raiders’ Front, but Turkish authorities suspected an al-Qaeda connection. The next day, the London-based newspaper al-Quds al-Arabi received an e-mail in which an al-Qaeda branch called the Brigades of the Martyr Abu Hafz al-Masri claimed responsibility for the Istanbul synagogue bombings.
More Suicide Truck Bombings in Istanbul, November 20, 2003: Two more suicide truck bombings devastated the British HSBC Bank and the British Consulate General in Istanbul, killing 27 persons and wounding at least 450. The dead included Consul General Roger Short. U.S., British, and Turkish officials suspected that al-Qaeda had struck again. The U.S. Consulate in Istanbul was closed, and the Embassy in Ankara advised American citizens in Istanbul to stay home.
Car Bombing in Kirkuk, November 20, 2003: A suicide car bombing in Kirkuk killed 5 persons. The target appeared to be the headquarters of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan. PUK officials suspected the Ansar al-Islam group, which was said to have sheltered fugitive Taliban and al-Qaeda members after the U.S. campaign in Afghanistan.
Office Bombing in Baghdad, December 19, 2003: A bomb destroyed the Baghdad office of the Supreme Council of the Islamic Revolution in Iraq, killing a woman and wounding at least 7 other persons.
Restaurant Bombing in Baghdad, December 31, 2003: A car bomb explosion outside Baghdad’s Nabil Restaurant killed 8 persons and wounded 35. The wounded included 3 Los Angeles Times reporters and 3 local employees.

Load Time Data for Blast Resistant Windows

Helen Cauldwell / Tom Goode

WEDNESDAY 9TH APRIL

EU Assistance in Urban UXO Operations

Frank Barink

“Bomb Capital” of the United States; Southern California

Overview of the public safety bomb squads in Southern California, USA. Brief explanation of the assets available and jurisdiction of the area of responsibilities.

Timothy Cooper

Los Angeles Policeman for 36 years, presently assigned to the LAPD Bomb Squad since 1988. Graduate of the Hazardous Devices School at Redstone Arsenal, US Army Ordnance and Chemical schools. Adjunct instructor for the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives. Recently retired US Army (Reserves) Master Sergeant, Ordnance Corps, 29 years.

New Disposal Method for Small Calibre Ammunition – Shredding

RED WINGS Ltd. has developed a new shredding line for small calibre  ammunition – 0.22” – 9 mm the SAAS (Small Arms Ammo Shredder) process. The process capacity - 2 -5 ton/day. The SAAS process is an environmental friendly techniques never use before, that for the first time it's implementing an efficient R3 policy.

ELI BEN-BASSAT LtCol (res)

ELI BEN-BASSAT is the Managing Director of Red Wings Ltd., a company which specializes in EOD/IEDD, DEMIL and Anti-Terror technical services and training capabilities services on a world wide basis. He has been with the IDF EOD and Israeli Police for the last 30 years, starting as a young officer and reaching the highest position in the Israeli EOD community - commander of IDF EOD unit.

GENERAL

Today most countries are looking to adopted the R3 (Resource Recovery & Recycling) policy.

  • The goals of these programs are to develop:
  • ammo disposal technologies that maximize recycle and reuse
  • cost effective technologies

After identifying the global need for an efficient small arms ammunition disposal technique RED WINGS invented the SAAS (Small Arms Ammo Shredder) process. The SAAS process is novel environmental friendly techniques never use before, that for the first time it's implementing an efficient R3 policy.
The SAAS process is base on shredding whole small arms cartridges (below 0.5") including links.

The results of the process :

  • a "clean" mixture of brass, copper and lead scrap - that is shipped to copper refineries
  • ~ 96% of propellant (smokeless powder) - that can be sold to blasting agents
  • manufacturer or to be converted to fertilizer using ACTODEMIL technology.

The SAAS process capacity is 2 – 5 tons per day according to the type and the caliber of the ammunition.
The process is environmentally friendly – totally ecological. A neglected portion of the propellant is burned during the process therefore all the emission from the process are passing through a series of filters and a wet scrubber to prevent any emission of pollutants into the air.

The process is very innovative and cost efficient, allowing us for the first time in history to PAY for the small caliber ammunition that we dispose of instead of getting paid for disposing it. 

The process is operational for a year now, and Red Wings Ltd. used this process for the disposal of 500 tons of small caliber ammunition (see video).
The major benefits of our solutions for utilization of excessive ammunitions are:

  • Mobility - The SAAS process equipment is mobile and can be mobilized anywhere in the world;
  • Speed – At Red Wings we strive to perform such projects in the fastest way possible, whilst maintaining high levels of security, quality and efficiency. The lead time for starting a demilitarization project is between 2 – 6 months from signing the contract, depending on the type of ammunition and the availability of our equipment, as we are involved in a few long term projects;
  • Ÿ Safety – Our approach is based on strict procedures conforming to the US and European environmental and security standards in this area.

 

The Use of Non Electric Initiators in the Maritime Scenario

An overview of the methodology and techniques for the disposal of Limpet Mines and other Ordnance/IED’s placed by the ill-disposed to effect maximum collateral damage to Warships and other High Value Units (HVU’s).

Lt Cdr Adrian Dann MCD AMW RNR

Lt Cdr Adrian Dann RNR is a former Royal Navy Mine Clearance Diving Officer having served for 25 years and left the RN in 2002.
His appointments included OIC of the Mine & Bomb Disposal Team at Faslane and 2nd in Command of one Her Majesty’s MCMV’s.
Still a serving member of the Royal Naval Reserve, Clearance Divers Division, he is currently OIC of the newly formed Underwater Force Protection Unit One.

Countering Low Tech IED’s
Group Capt (RET) Ajith de Silva
 
 
Assessment of High Velocity IED Fragments versus Armour

Ordnance Test Solutions have been visualising the projectiles formed by typical roadside EFP type IEDs using high speed video. They have also developed high velocity guns and fragment simulating projectiles to reproduce the EFPs.

Phil Gotts – Ordnance Test Solutions Ltd

Phil Gotts has been the project manager for armour related projects within Ordnance Test Solutions Ltd for the last 2 years. Prior to that he spent 13 years in UK MOD both in and leading, the team with responsibility for R&D in materials and systems for use in personal armour including EOD and search suits.
 
 

 

Assessment of High Velocity IED Fragments versus Armour

EFP based IEDs are commonly used against armoured vehicles in both Iraq and Afghanistan. These devices are simple to manufacture and are effective against a wide range of armoured vehicles.

Ordnance Test Solutions Ltd have manufactured surrogate devices based upon public domain information. Two designs of copper liner have been made. One produces a single large hemispherical-nosed projectile, while the other produces a stream of usually three more conical-nosed projectiles.

OTS have developed a means of visualising these projectiles in flight using high speed video. The experimental configuration uses mirrors to provide orthogonal images of the projectiles. From these images the velocity can be calculated and estimates of shape and mass can be made.

Limitations using explosively-filled EFPs on outdoor ranges have led OTS to design two high velocity guns to fire fragment simulating projectiles. These guns will fire projectiles of up to 500g at almost 2,000 m/s. High speed video is used for these FSPs as well, although there is no requirement for orthogonal views in this case.

The advantages and disadvantages of using high velocity guns over real explosively-filled devices are discussed.

EDITORIAL

It may be the first car bomb was the one used for the assassination attempt on Ottoman Sultan Abdul Hamid II in 1905 in İstanbul by Armenian separatists, in the command of Belgian anarchist Edward Jorris.

In the past, groups to use car bombs included:

In 1920, when Italian anarchist Mario Buda parked his horse-drawn wagon filled with explosives and shrapnel near the corner of Wall and Broad streets in New York City, directly across from J P Morgan

BATF Explosives Standards

BATF summary table illustrating the size and range of effectiveness of car bombs by vehicle type used
 

Mass-casualty car bombing, and especially suicide car bombing, is currently a predominantly Middle Eastern phenomenon. The tactic was first introduced to the region by the Stern gang, who used it extensively against Palestinian and British targets; it was subsequently taken up by Palestinian bombers as well.[3]The tactic was widely used in the Lebanese Civil War by the Islamic fundamentalist group Hezbollah. The most notable car bombing was the 1983 Beirut barracks bombing, which killed 241 U.S. Marines and 58 French military personnel. In the Lebanese civil war, an estimated 3,641 car bombs were detonated.[4]
Groups that still use car bombs include:
 

History of Vehicle Bombing

Michael Coldrick MBE GM

During twenty-five years in the British army Mike Coldrick specialised in ammunition, bomb disposal and intelligence. He has received several awards for gallantry and distinguished service. In 1972 was mentioned in despatches for dealing with booby trap IEDs and later the same year won the George Medal for dealing with over 100 IEDs in Northern Ireland.

In 1973 he was elected the Army Man of the Year. He was appointed Chief Instructor to NATO on the Lance nuclear missile system. He developed Weapons Intelligence in 3 Infantry Brigade Northern Ireland to provide tactical intelligence to brigade commanders and was promoted to command Weapons intelligence operations throughout Northern Ireland for which he was made an MBE.

In 1983 he left the army to join New Scotland Yards Anti terrorist branch where he augmented an elite team to fight a growing terrorist threat. For seventeen years he was at the cutting edge of counter terrorist operations dealing with major incidents as well as the security of Royalty, visiting Heads of State and political events. He was invited to be a member of the Security Service Working Party on Terrorist Devices and Methods serving on it for 14 years. He has personally rendered safe some of the largest IEDs deployed against civilian targets.

Mike Coldrick enjoys an international reputation. He has lectured at the FBI Academy, Quantico. In 2004 he chaired the ASEAN police workshop on suicide bombing. Since retiring in 2000 he has consulted to major corporations and governments and has been involved in security projects in America, Yemen, Nigeria, Sri Lanka, Africa, Colombia, India, Nepal and Iraq. He is an advisor to Aegis Risk Management, London.

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